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The General Services Administration (GSA) Heartland Region is implementing a best 
value process (which minimizes time and cost deviations 98% of the time) and which 
minimizes the need for client’s decision making, transfers the risk and control of a project to 
the vendor, and forces the vendor to  manage and minimize the non-technical risk that the 
vendor does not control.  The Performance Information Risk Management System (PIRMS) 
has been tested by the US Army Medical Command and has minimized over 50% of client 
project management and risk management transactions, and also minimized cost and time 
deviations by as much as 70%.  The new paradigm uses Deming’s concept of managing 
and minimizing the project deviation instead of meeting minimum standards.  The system 
forces the client’s representatives to do quality assurance, and the vendor to do quality 
control.  The mechanism used is a risk management plan and a weekly risk report that 
creates transparency between buyer and vendor.  The system can minimize up to 90% of 
the government’s transactions and activities.  The system is a new paradigm for government 
systems. 
Keywords:  Best value procurement, minimized government management, high 
vendor performance, and measured environment              
Introduction 
The General Services Administration (GSA) is the largest buyer of non-military 
services in the United States.  It is a large management based organization.  An Achilles 
heel for any large organization is the number of layers of management, the large number of 
managers and subject matter experts (SME) and the practice of managing, directing and 
controlling vendors/contractors who are supposed to be experts at what they do.   
The current status of most projects in the GSA is where vendors (architect/ 
engineers and contractors) continually rely on being managed, directed, and controlled by 
GSA project managers and contracting officers.  To get a quality set of construction 
documents, the government project managers complete extensive quality control reviews of 
the A/E’s construction documents, once the sole responsibility of the A/E design firms.  GSA 
personnel (CORs, PMs, and COs) continually manage, direct, and control the contractors in 
construction.  Control and risk are not transferred to the vendors, thus making it difficult to 
hold vendors accountable for deviations.  Projects incur change orders due to design 





of projects could take between 1 to 4 years.  GSA processes and requirements are 
continually being developed and expanded at various levels both nationally and regionally in 
an attempt to increase the performance of the vendors.     
Upper level management in the GSA has struggled with implementing a sustainable, 
useable, and accurate system that measures the performance of their vendors and project 
managers.  Shrinking budgets, increased workload requirements, and the increased need 
for project managers to manage, direct, and control vendors, make the updating, collection, 
and analysis of performance information very difficult. The GSA has been exposed to many 
management measurement systems and philosophies (Alsup, 2010; Topi, 2010):  
1. Quality Management Circle (part of TQM) 
2. TQM (total quality management) (early 1990s) 
3. eTMP (electronic transaction management playbook) (2006) 
4. TMP (transaction management playbook) (2006) 
5. HCAM (included the following TMP, OMP, LCP, & AMP) (2005) 
6. OMP (occupancy management playbook) 
7. LCP (large construction playbook) 
8. AMP (account management playbook) 
However, the strategic objective of increasing performance and value of vendor 
services and measurement of the performance remains elusive.  
Problem 
The stubbornness of the problem of the GSA’s inability to sustain performance 
measurements in a timely fashion and increase vendor performance may be a systems 
problem and not a GSA unique management/leadership problem.  The current GSA system 
forces the project managers to document, maintain, and report the performance information.  
Because of the current project manager/vendor relationships and their heavy workload, 
project managers may not be motivated to accurately and consistently document the 
performance information.  The current system of delivery has the following suboptimal 
characteristics: 
1. The GSA project managers are required to manage, direct, and control the 
vendors. 
2. There is no transfer of risk or control to the vendors. 
3. The relationship between the vendors and the project managers may dilute 
accountability. 
4. The current delivery system does not motivate vendors to preplan and 
manage and minimize the risk that they do not control (think in the best 
interest of the client). 
Hypothesis 
Deming (1982) identifies the GSA problem as a systems problem.  The authors 





upper level management. Increasing effort to optimize performance in a stable environment 
may not be successful.  The system must be changed to increase performance, and have a 
sustainable performance measurement system that results in an increase in vendor 
performance.   
Methodology 
The authors propose that the GSA find a new system that has the following 
characteristics: 
1. Run by a core team of systems managers who understand a performance 
information based system. 
2. Selects vendors by their capability to understand a project and manage and 
minimize deviations that are caused by sources outside of their control. 
3. Transfer the risk and control to vendors, who by contract must preplan, 
manage and minimize risk that they do not control, and manage the risk of 
their projects by measuring and minimizing cost and time deviations. 
4. Measure the vendors’ performance. 
5. Vendors are held accountable for all deviations unless they can dominantly 
document the source of the risk and how they attempted to manage and 
minimize the risks. 
6. System has past performance of success in other government organizations. 
Search for Performance Measurement Systems for 
Vendors/Organizations 
The GSA team composed of a project manager and a procurement officer proposed 
the above plan to their division manager in the heartland region located in Kansas City.  
They proposed using a best value approach to solicitation to procure the services of an 
organization that could: 
1. Provide a system that meets the requirements of the new system. 
2. Show documented evidence that the system measured performance and 
resulted in a dominant increase of performance. 
3. Show capability to educate and train GSA personnel to be able to understand 
the new system and run the system.   
The solicitation was posted on August 15, 2009.  There were only three proposers.  
The GSA identified the Performance Information Procurement System (PIPS) as the only 
system that could meet the new requirements.  It was the only system that: 
1. Had documented performance over 15 years. 
2. Minimized the amount of management, direction, and control. 
3. Transferred risk and accountability to the vendor. 






5. Provided a mechanism whereby the vendor managed the risk that they did 
not control. 
6. Minimized the transactions (meetings, emails, and telecom.) 
No other vendor options would accept responsibility for ensuring the performance 
measurements on all participants, a resulting increase in performance and value, and 
minimized management, direction and control.  The other vendor options proposed to put a 
performance measurement system in place, but would take no responsibility for the 
successful implementation or the impact on performance of the organization and the 
vendors.  The best value PIPS system dominantly differentiated itself as the only option with 
the potential of disruptive change required to employ a sustainable measurement system 
and result in a dominant increase in performance and value.       
Industry Analysis 
The construction industry structure (CIS) model (Figure 1) (Kashiwagi, 2009) 
identifies the difference between what the GSA and other owners currently employ, and 
what is needed to employ a sustainable performance measurement system that has 
accompanying increase in performance and value.   
 
Construction Industry Structure  
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
The CIS identified the current GSA system as a price based system regardless of the 
perception of not awarding projects based on price (Sullivan, 2005).  The Price Based 
System (Quadrant I), has the following characteristic: 
1. Owner representative attempts to direct and control the vendor. 
2. Deductive logic assumes that the owner would only hire a vendor who knew 
what they were doing (expert). 
3. Someone who should know less about what is being done is directing 
someone who is an expert in what is being delivered.   
In the best value system, the client identifies their intent, but asks the industry 
(vendors) who can deliver the best value that meets the intent of the owner?  This system 
has the following characteristics: 





2. Client selects the best value based on performance and price (value). 
3. Vendors preplan, manage and minimize risk they don’t control. (They have no 
technical risk; they are experts.) 
4. Clients do quality assurance (ensure that the vendor has quality control and 
risk management systems). 
  
The price based system is: 
1. Inefficient.  
2. Requires more people. 
3. Has more confusion. 
4. Subjective. 
5. Higher flow of information required between parties. 
6. If performance measures are kept, they are very subjective and potentially 
could be construed as biased.  There are more measurements that require an 
expert to decide what is good performance.    
7. Requires people to partner. 
8. Relationships are important between vendors and the client’s PMs. 
9. Adversarial.   
10. Because minimum requirements are used, performance will be in decline.   
11. Not accountable. 
12. Has high risk. 
13. Low performance (on time, on budget, meet client’s expectations.) 
 
The best value system: 
1. Is more efficient. 
2. Requires less people. 
3. Is measured with few and simple measurements. 
4. Is transparent.  
5. Uses alignment of resources. 
6. Has minimized flow of information. 
7. Minimizes partnering exercises.  
8. Managed by minimizing deviations.  
9. Has continuous improvement.   
10. Has a high level of accountability.   





12. Minimizes transactions.    
Difference Between the Two Systems 
The difference between systems is that the price based vendor is reactive, managed, 
controlled and directed by the client/buyer; the best value vendor is proactive, preplans, 
manages and minimizes risk that they do not control, measures their performance, and 
manages their project by minimizing deviations.   In the price-based sector, the client directs 
the vendor using minimum requirements; the vendors transform the minimum into a 
maximum, and drive the performance the opposite direction (Figure 2).  
  
Figure 1. Min/Max Dilemma 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
Figure 2. Price-Based Award 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
The high performance vendor (high performance and low risk) can see a project from 
beginning to end.  They identify risk that they do not control, and plan solutions to minimize 
the risk.  The low performer (high risk) prices only what they are directed to price.  The 
overall effect of the client directing the vendors is the following (Figure 3): 
1. High performers become reactive instead of proactive.  They are told to price 
only what is directed, regardless of completeness, correctness, or whether it 
is doable.   
2. They are directed to assume that the directions are perfect. 
3. Therefore, they are directed to give the lowest possible price, assuming 
nothing goes wrong. 
Figure 4 shows the business approach to Quadrant I Price Based system.  The high 
performers, who get paid more for their expertise, get sent to the price based system, where 
they are directed and controlled by someone who is not an expert.  The confusing 
environment results in lower production of the high performer.  They become out of 
alignment, overpriced, and leave the environment.  A more damaging result of the system is 







Figure 3. Business Approach 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
The outsourcing owner who transfers risk and control to the expert vendor will get 
the high performer.  It is the only win-win situation.  The high performer will preplan, manage 
and minimize risk that they do not control to finish on time and maximize their profit, do the 
project once, and get paid and not go back to redo or fix problems.  This is the efficient best 
value system.     
Best Value Performance Information Procurement System 
(PIPS) 
After identifying the requirement to have a new system/environment that reflected the 
best value environment, the GSA selected the best value PIPS system to move from the 
price based to the best value environment (GSA contract #: GS06P09GYD0027).  The 
documented performance of the PIPS system included: 
1. 16 years of testing (1994-present) delivering 700+ construction services 
projects valued at over $800 million. 
2. Research funding of $8.5 million. 
3. Minimized client risk/project management activities by up to 90%. 
4. Maximized vendor profit by up to 100%, at no additional cost to the client. 
5. Delivered performance of 98% on time, no contractor generated cost and 
time deviations, and meeting client’s expectations. 
6. Arizona State University (ASU) moved PIPS into non-construction areas 
including the delivery of food services, IT networking, IT data centers, help 
desks, sports marketing, gym equipment, document control, long distance 
education services, and furniture buys.  ASU received investments of $100 
million over ten years due to the change of system environment, from price 
based to best value.   
7. The Dutch infrastructure agency used PIPS to deliver $1 billion of highway 
infrastructure to solve their problems with the delivery of construction.   
8. The Bank of Botswana used PIPS to deliver a critical bank facility and found it 
tremendously better than the traditional process. 
9. The State of Alaska is delivering a $200 million Electronic Resource Planning 





PIPS is a licensed structure/process from Arizona State University developed by 
Dean Kashiwagi and the Performance Based Studies Research Group (PBSRG.)   PIPS 
has three main phases (Kashiwagi, 2010): 
1. Phase I: Selection of the best value vendor. 
2. Phase II: Pre-award/pre-planning and creation of the risk management plan 
(RMP) and the weekly risk report (WRR.)  
3. Phase III: Project delivery by the risk management of deviation of time and 
cost.   
  
4. 
Figure 4. PIPS/PIRMS Phases 
 (Kashiwagi, 2010) 
During the early development of PIPS, the selection phase was identified as the 
most important phase.  As more tests were run, it was identified that the pre-award, 
preplanning phase was a more critical phase.  The risk management capability of PIPS 
became obvious, and the term, the Performance Information Risk Management System 
(PIRMS) was created to allow owners to use the risk management capability of the system 
even though they would select their vendor using the price based selection mode.   
PIPS has six major filters in the selection phase to ensure performance (Figures 6 
and 7): 
1. Requires the vendors to prove the potential to perform through documented 
past performance including the performance of critical personnel (project 
manager), and critical sub-vendors (engineering, professional consultants, or 
other crafts). 
2. Capability to do the project.  This submittal is a blind review of the vendor’s 
capability to do the project: 
a. Requires the vendors to show an understanding of the scope of the 
project in terms of the biggest technical risks in a concise and short 
explanation (two page submittal).  The high performers should identify the 
major technical challenges of the project and what makes them capable 
of minimizing the risk of nonperformance. 
b. Risk Assessment/Value Added (RAVA) submittal that forces the vendor to 
identify the risk that the vendor does not control, and how they will 
manage and minimize that risk so it does not occur.  It also asks the 
vendors to document dominant added value being offered by the vendor 





difference in project value) that makes them different from their 
competitors. 
c. The vendor is also asked for a milestone schedule, and how they will 
measure their performance during the project.   
d. The vendor will also submit a cost breakout.    
3. The interview of the critical personnel of the vendor to identify the person’s 
relative vision, ability to predict things before they occur, preplan and their 
capability to be accountable. 
4. A cost check to ensure the best value is not overly expensive.       
5. Prioritization of the best value based on the capability to perform (the past 
performance information, scope rating, RAVA rating, milestone schedule 
rating, rating on performance measurement system, interview rating and 
price). 
6. Pre-award Phase where just the best value vendor creates a risk 
management plan (RMP) and a weekly risk report (WRR) that they will use to 
manage and minimize the deviation of the project.  The WRR and RMP track 
risks that the vendor does not control.  This is the key mechanism in 
PIPS/PIRMS, and is the regulator that ensures that risk and control is 
transferred to the vendor.  This becomes a key component of the contract, 
and decommissions any attempts for the owner’s PM to manage, direct, and 
control the vendor.  This results in an alignment of resources, as it is in the 
best interest of all parties. 
A major paradigm shift is the movement from management, direction, and control to 
quality control/quality assurance.  This movement assumes that the vendor has no technical 
risk, and therefore will concentrate on managing and minimizing the risk they don’t control.  
This will be more fully explained in a following section.     
The vendor then writes their own contract (technical requirement, legal requirements 
of the owner, risk management plan and weekly risk control report.)  The project is then 
awarded.  The vendor self manages themselves based on the contract, managing and 
minimizing the cost and time deviation of the project.  At the end of the project, the vendor is 






   




Figure 6. PIPS/PIRMS Self Regulating Closed Loop  
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
A Paradigm Shift: Understanding that Expert Vendors Have no 
Technical Risk 
A major departure from the traditional project management practices is the 
understanding and handling of risk.  Information Measurement Theory (IMT) identifies that 
by definition, high performance/expert personnel have minimal or no technical risk 
(Kashiwagi, 2010).  If there is technical risk, it is only because the client hired a vendor who 
does not have the expertise and therefore is not capable of minimizing risk.  Instead of 
managing, directing, and controlling the vendor, the owner is now creating a new 
environment, where the vendor is identified as the expert.  Therefore, the new environment 
minimizes all management, direction, and control of the vendor.  This simple but difficult 
change in paradigm, forces the transfer of risk and control to the expert, and aligns all 
resources.   
The authors propose that the impact of unforeseen conditions can be minimized if 
experts are used to manage and minimize the risk that they don’t control.  The only risk high 
performers have is risk that they do not control (risk that is brought by other participants, 





making by other participants at the wrong time during the process, and the changing of 
expectations) (Figure 8). 
The new paradigm motivates vendors to preplan the project from beginning to end and 
know the risk that they do not control and how they will manage that risk before they accept 
the project.  By deductive logic, a system that increases client management, direction, and 
control moves the activity to the more inexperienced vendors and personnel (Figure 8).  This 
results in lower performance, reactive behavior, minimum standards or expectations, and 
minimum accountability. 
Price based contracts emphasize the technical risk that the vendors must control.  
Price based contracts attract the less experienced, and makes the very experienced less 
competitive (Figures 4 and 8).  Best value contracts must identify and communicate the 
expectations of the client but emphasize the requirement of the vendors to manage and 
minimize the risk that they do not control, thus thinking in the best interest of the client and 
creating a “win-win.”  Price based contracts must cater to the inexperienced and increase 
the flow of information, contract documents, and client management, direction, and control.  
Best value contracts cater to the high performing contractors who need minimal information, 
who act in the best interest of the client by giving high technical service (no technical risk) 
and manage and minimize the risk that the vendor does not control through the use of 
quality control and risk management plans.   
 
Figure 7. Inexperienced versus Experienced Vendor Risk Model 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
High performers and experts by definition are rarely surprised, are rarely affected by 
“unforeseen conditions,” and if there are “unforeseen conditions,” high performers have a 
preplanned solution that they can easily identify, manage, and minimize the cost and time 
deviation.  Due to the low performing mentality of the construction industry, and resulting low 
performance of the industry participants, the risk of “unforeseen conditions” has increased, 
and instead of requiring high performance and the minimization of risk that the vendor does 
not control, the industry has created a transaction based solution of client management, 
direction and control, which increases the number of participants who do not have the 
capability to minimize the risk.  These participants create silos where they verify and 
manage the vendors schedule and cost, negotiate prices, and approve all deviations in 
schedule or materials.  In this inefficient system, the inexperienced contractor becomes 
more competitive than the high-performance contractor with very experienced personnel, 
who cannot efficiently do their project in an environment of redundant and un-needed 
transactions. 
These deductive concepts have not only been confirmed through the 15 years of 





management, direction, and control of subject matter experts (SME), transferring the risk 
and control to the vendor, by forcing the vendor to write the contract which requires an 
expert vendor, and by forcing the vendor to manage and minimize the risk they do not 
control, a structure has been created which aligns resources and minimizes the 
transactions.  The regulator of the structural change is the weekly risk report (WRR) and the 
risk management plan (RMP.)  They create transparency, which minimizes the need for 
management, direction and control.     
Method of Measurement 
The method of measurement of performance utilized by PIPS is a novel approach 
which has had successful results in the past five years (Kashiwagi, 2009).  The assumption 
is that a large organization delivering services with project managers who are accustomed 
to manage, direct, and control, will have a difficult time consistently and doing timely 
reporting and analysis of performance due to the inefficiency of a management based 
system.  PIPS identifies who should be at risk (expert), and forces the measurement of 
performance (deviation of project time and cost) by the vendors.  The deviations are then 
reviewed for accuracy by the client/buyer’s professional (quality assurance.)  The 
information goes directly to the top decision maker in the organization, bypassing the normal 
filtering system in a bureaucracy.  A simplistic use of spreadsheets does the following: 
1. Identifies the deviation rates of all projects. 
2. Identifies the top ten riskiest projects, and which participant in the supply 
chain caused the deviation. 
3. Measures all participants in the supply chain, giving a relative performance 
rating based on deviations and performance.   
The PIPS measuring system overcomes the major obstacles large organizations 
have: 
1. Subjective filtering of measurements. 
2. Lack of timely reporting. 
3. Lack of time to do accurate reporting. 
GSA Strategic and Tactical Plans to Implement New 
Environment 
The GSA signed a five-year contract with the Performance Based Studies Research 
Group (PBSRG) to implement the new best value system.  Previous research results 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) identified that both a strategic plan and a tactical plan are required to 
successfully make the transformation.  Previous results identified the following priorities: 
1. Identification of a core group of visionaries who could understand the 
theoretical change in systems, and be systems managers and managers of 
personnel.   
2. Education, development of the core group of visionaries to learn how to use 
the system.   





4. General education to the owner’s organization of the PIPS system.   
The strategic plan encompasses the first two objectives, and the tactical plan is the 
second two objectives.  The tactical plan (second two objectives) cannot be implemented 
without the strategic plan.  The strategic plan therefore, must include the following: 
1. The development of the visionaries. 
2. Theoretical education of the visionaries. 
3. Job transformation of the visionaries from project managers to educators and 
systems managers. 
4. Changing of the effectiveness of the chain of command. 
5. The visionary group must learn to apply the concept of PIPS to their 
organization’s transformation. 
6. Documentation of the transformation by the system. 
7. Peer review by other visionaries located at other organizations who are 
working toward the same goals.  
8. Development of measurements and a schedule showing the improvement in 
performance and value. 
The tactical plan must include: 
1. The modification of the PIPS to move the owner’s organization without 
increasing resistance due to the change of efficiency and structure. 
2. Education on PIPS to both vendors and PMs running the system. 
3. Prototype testing and implementing PIPS by core team visionaries.   
4. Design of the information system. 
If the concept of transferring risk and control to the expert vendor, and aligning the 
resources in the entire supply chain through measurement of deviation is accurate, this 
system transformation is not industry specific.  It is a system regulated by measurement, 
which aligns all the participants in the supply chain, minimizing the transactions and forcing 
experts to be accountable.  It will bring discomfort if a subject matter expert (SME) is 
misaligned or does not currently have accountability.  Therefore the transformation has to be 
“gentle” and evolutionary.   
Progress of the GSA 
The implementation of PIPS in the GSA has been relatively optimized due to the 
following: 
1. The head of the core team visionaries, the region director of the organization, 
was already attempting to transform the organization to a measured 
organization.  His strategic goals of efficiency and effectiveness of both 
vendors and the GSA organization was already in place.   
2. The PMs of the core team were identified and selected based on the 
Information Measurement Theory (IMT) and therefore were attempting to use 





3. This is the first time in 16 years of testing that both a PM and procurement 
officer were original members of the visionary core team, and the director 
was already attempting the transformation.   
4. This is the first time that the PIPS was selected through application of PIPS, 
thus confirming to the core team that PIPS was dominant in its ability to 
transform organizational environment/systems.   
First Measurement of Existing Performance 
The core team selected 8 projects where information was readily available to identify 
the performance of the existing environment.  The performance measurements include: 
1. Average cost/scope of projects: $526,992 
2. Average duration of projects: 152.5 days 
3. Cost deviation of projects (percentage): 7% 
4. Time deviation of projects (percentage): 231% 
5. Customer satisfaction (1 -10 rating, 10 being optimal): 6.5 
The core team is also interested in the following measurements that will be collected 
through surveys: 
1. Vendor profit margin: TBD 
2. Vendor rating of delivery system: TBD 
3. Vendor perception of new system (1 – 10 rating): TBD   
4. Number of projects a PM is responsible for: TBD 
The GSA’s next step is to complete six (6) test projects and collect data to confirm 
increased performance with the new best value PIPS system.  The Contractor and PM shall 
rate the following before and after on the traditional system vs. the new best value PIPS 
system: 
1. Effectiveness (deviations.) 
2. Value of preplanning by vendor as perceived by both the vendors and the 
GSA PM. 
3. Value of vendor managing and minimizing the risk that the vendor does not 
control as perceived by all participants. 
4. Vendor’s profit margin maximization. 
5. Accountability of all the participants as perceived by all participants. 
6. Successfulness and impact of the transfer of risk and accountability to the 
vendor. 
7. Project coordination by the vendor with the client. 





Schedule of Implementation 
It is a five-year tactical plan: 
1. Year 1: set up core team structure.  Run the first tests with core team and a 
few PMs.   
2. Year 2: set up the Directors Report and expand both the running of the entire 
process and the risk management reporting (which measures the 
performance of projects). 
3. Years 3 - 5: expand implementation within organization.  Visionary core team 
becomes a subject matter expert (SME) to assist in the transformation of 
other organizations.     
Analysis of the Effort 
This research effort is using the deductive approach (confirmatory) instead of the 
inductive approach (exploratory.)  The success of the project will be determined by 
measurements of observation which minimize subjectivity as much as possible.  The 
following are observations of the effort thus far: 
1. PIPS has been identified by a GSA selection process as the only option with 
documentation of proven success to transform an organization’s environment 
from a management, direction, and control environment to a best value, 
alignment, leadership based environment. 
2. A large federal organization who is constrained by federal law, will implement 
the PIPS process for selection of vendor, and contract administration.   
3. A visionary core team has been organized that is optimal in terms of a high-
ranking visionary leader, and visionary PM and procurement components. 
4. For the first time, strategic and tactical plans have been drawn up and will be 
used in the research test.   
Conclusion    
The GSA Heartland region is implementing an advanced and theoretically sound 
best value delivery process to transform the system from a price based to a best value 
environment.  The major objectives include: minimization of management, direction, and 
control transactions, the transfer of risk and control to vendors who can minimize the risk, 
measurement of performance of the vendors and the GSA organization, and to measure an 
increase in performance and value of the services being delivered.  A core group of 
visionaries are attempting to transform the organizational approach from one of 
management of personnel to a systems management, where performance measurements 
drive alignment of resources.  This is a significant effort for a large federal organization that 
normally is management based and has difficulty in minimizing bureaucracy. 
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